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SYMPOSIUM: ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF RESOLVING
ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES*
This symposium provided a lively and interestingformatfor all of those
in attendance. Unlike other symposia, this proceeding was not conducted as
a series of paperpresentationsfollowed by a short question and answer penod. The nature of the topic, alternative dispute resolution, createda situation ripefor interactionbetween the panelists as well as between the panelists
and the audience.
Audience members were provided with a brief statement of each panelist's thesis priorto the start of the program; therefore, the audience was able
to refer to these statements throughout the program. The panelists in turn
gave brief presentations highlighting a full range of dispute resolution
techniques.
Following the panel presentations, the floor, guided by co-moderators
Professors Henry Perritt and John Hyson, was open for discussion. This
resulted in an impressive, well-rounded colloquium which explored the various ways in which mediative perspectives may be employed in diverse professional situations.
The EditorialBoard has reproduced this edited transcriptof the entire
program. The Board hopes that this will provide the reader with some insight into the dynamics underlying this particularpanel and possibly alternative dispute resolution itself
ELIZABETH GRIECO:
Thanks for coming out on a snowy Saturday. We appreciate
it. I'd like to just take a moment to thank those involved with the
organization of today's events. First of all, thank you Professor
Henry Perritt and ProfessorJohn Hyson, for your help in organizing this symposium. I would also like to thank Professor Doris
Brogan and staff members Cynthia Calder, Maureen Luke, Tim
Szuhaj, and Ann McGill. We can thank Ann later. She was re* Articles authored by each panelist follow this transcript.
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sponsible for the reception. So without further ado, I'd like to
present Dean Frankino, Dean of the Law School.
DEAN FRANKINO:
Thank you, Liz. It's a pleasure to welcome all of you to the
inaugural symposium of the EnvironmentalLaw Journal. When one
puts together a law journal or a law review, or indeed, a symposium, there is always an inaugural event, but actually, most of
them have a pre-inaugural event. This symposium certainly has a
very distinguished pre-inaugural event. Last year a dedicated and
very hard-working group of law students, who are now alumni,
put together a symposium under the aegis of what is called VIEW.
VIEW is the Villanova Incorporated Environmental Watch. They had a
very, very successful symposium last year, which resulted in a
publication called the VIEW Proceedings. Now, the VIEW Proceedings are to the Environmental Law Journal,what number 0 is to the
Villanova Law Review; that is, it's the inaugural issue. I see a
number of people who were very much involved in that, what I
think was an historic event in the development of our law school.
The Editor-in-Chief of the VIEW Proceedings, David Butterworth, is
here, who is now an associate with Morgan, Lewis and Bockius.
Welcome back, David. And I see Daniel Boehmcke, but I don't
see John LiCari, I think John is supposed to be here. Daniel is
with the Environmental Protection Agency [EPA]. I see Tim
Campbell who is now with Stradley, Ronen. Robert Toland, who
also was one of the managing editors of the VIEW Proceedings, is
here; he is presently a clerk for the Honorable Herbert J. Hutton
of the United States District Court of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.
I note all of this because without their efforts, today would
not happen. Without their efforts, the EnvironmentalLaw Journal
would not have been presented to me, to the faculty, nor would it
have been approved. We now carry on the tradition with the inaugural EnvironmentalLaw Journal symposium and we look forward
next month to the first issue of the EnvironmentalLaw Journal. So,
for us at Villanova this is a major event, and we are extremely
happy, that you're here. You're going to be present with a very,
very distinguished panel and I hope you'll enjoy the afternoon.
It's my pleasure now to ask Professor Henry Perritt, who is
going to moderate today's proceedings, to come forward and take
over. Hank.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol2/iss1/1
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HENRY PERRITT:
Thank you, Steve. It's worth endorsing what Dean Frankino
has to say about the entrepreneurial spirit of the people who organized the Villanova IncorporatedEnvironmental Watch and the proceedings last year that led to the Journal. It's also appropriate to
describe the kind of environment Dean Frankino has helped create here in which that kind of entrepreneurial spirit is encouraged. This is a terrific program that has been put together by
the editorial board led by Editor-in-Chief Karen Palestini, and organized more directly by Liz Grieco. We want to follow a somewhat unusual format. At these kinds of proceedings, it's typical
that you hear fairly lengthy presentations from each of the experts
that has joined the panel followed by what is supposed to be an
ample question and answer period, but frequently the press of
time and people running over their allotted schedules results in a
very compressed and limited opportunity for discussion. We
thought that the most interesting way to explore the topics and
issues involved in alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and the
way ADR can be used in connection with site specific environmental disputes, was to have the maximum amount of interaction
between the speakers and the speakers and you. So, what we have
asked the speakers to do is summarize very briefly their positions
and how they came to the area of ADR. Then most of the afternoon will be devoted to a discussion, possibly some argument
among the speakers, and discussion and possibly some argument
between you and the speakers.
At the end of the afternoon, before the reception, there will
be an opportunity for the speakers to make any concluding remarks that they wish. I'd like to introduce the speakers in the
order of their presentations. The order of presentation has been
determined in rough fashion by the degree of institutional formality [formal systems of organized practices and procedures]
that each of them has experienced. Jonathan Brock is going to go
first. Jon's experience in helping to resolve environmental disputes involves the least degree of institutional formality.
Jon is currently an associate professor at the Graduate School
of Public Affairs at the University of Washington in Seattle. He
began his career not too far from here at Franklin and Marshall
College. He received an MBA from Harvard Business School.
He and I had the opportunity to work together for the United
States Government for a period of time on the Wage and Price
Control Program and in the United. States Department of Labor.
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991
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Jon served on the faculty at the Kennedy School of Government
at Harvard. He's written some very influential books and articles
on dispute resolution in the labor and management context.
Leonard Charla will speak second. Mr. Charla is Senior VicePresident with Clean Sites, an organization that helps people put
together dispute resolution techniques for environmental disputes. Mr. Charla began his career under the oversight of Dean
Frankino at Catholic University. He was Editor-in-Chief, I believe, of the law review at Catholic University. He has a distinguished and varied career as a lawyer, working for a number of
federal government agencies and for General Motors Corporation. He has been quite innovative with Clean Sites in terms of
working out dispute resolution techniques suitable for a particular dispute.
Larry Bacow is an associate professor of law and environmental policy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Larry
started his career at MIT where he received a bachelor's degree in
economics, and then, he moved up the river to Cambridge, and
proceeded to get three degrees from Harvard University, including a Master of Public Policy, a Ph.D. and a law degree. Larry and
I first met each other when he was working on his Ph.D. dissertation. He wanted to look at some innovative techniques for resolving disputes in connection with occupational safety and health
and we were able to scare up a little bit of support for Larry's
Ph.D. research, which resulted in an influential book on negotiating occupational safety and health disputes in the workplace.
Larry then went on to write a statute in Massachusetts that set up
an institutional framework for resolving hazardous waste siting
disputes. He has continued to be involved in working out specific
disputes in Massachusetts. In terms of institutional formality,
Larry comes third after Mr. Charla because his most prominent
experience in connection with the Massachusetts statute obviously is associated with a more formal and a more permanent legislative structure.
Jerome Simandle, United States Magistrate, from the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey, comes last in
the sense of institutional formality. Judge Simandle works within
what is the most formal of the permanent institutional arrangements that we work with: the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Judge Simandle, despite the formality of the Federal Rules, has a
considerable reputation for being creative and effective in terms
of using the formal processes of the federal courts as an effective
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol2/iss1/1
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mechanism for resolving environmental disputes. Judge Simandie received his J.D. degree from the University of Pennsylvania,
where he was Editor-in-Chief of the law review. He served as an
Assistant United States Attorney before he joined the bench as a
Magistrate in New Jersey. With that, I would like to turn the proceedings over to Jon Brock. Jon.
JONATHAN BROCK:
Thank you very much, Hank. It's a pleasure to be here and
it's a pleasure to see some snow. I grew up in the northeast and
Seattle gives me too little opportunity to see it unless I charge
into the mountains.
Let me say at the outset that I entered into this research that
I'm about to describe to you because I'm a believer in alternative
dispute resolution procedures as a useful adjunct to the ways in
which we resolve conflicts in this society; specifically, those procedures that probably are more familiar to you in terms of a traditional legal education.
The further I got in the research and the more I looked into
alternative dispute resolution processes, the more I recognized
the limitations and the particular ingredients that had to be there
in order for them to be valuable and to produce useful resolution
of conflicts. As we looked into the issue of institutionalizing alternative dispute resolution procedures, we found that there were
many more problems and many more impediments to using institutionalized procedures than there were for site-specific
procedures.
Let me define those terms, at least in some loose way, for the
purposes of the discussion today. A "site-specific" dispute primarily involves one site. Maybe it's a waste-siting issue, maybe
it's a particular regulation: it is always a particular dispute where
the parties come together, sometimes with a third party, and develop a series of procedures in order to negotiate, or possibly arbitrate, the dispute. "Institutionalized mechanism" is a term that
I'll use during the course of the day. An institutionalized mechanism is one where a set of rules are put forth to govern the resolution of a series of site-specific disputes that are expected to arise
in that subject area or geographic area. The distinction is between one dispute, site-specific, and a system intended to allow
resolution of a series of site-specific disputes that might be expected to occur.
The basic premise of my argument is that the ingredients that
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991
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make it possible for site-specific resolution to work often either
get lost when the system becomes institutionalized, or some important aspects of it are otherwise missed. I put these ingredients
into two categories: unrecognized differences between the institutionalized and site-specific resolution, and unrecognized similarities. Just as a matter of categorizing, I'd like to use those two
categories.
The premise that underlies these distinctions, these unrecognized differences and similarities, includes three watchwords
which make for value and success where alternative dispute resolution procedures have been successful. These three watchwords
are the following: flexibility, matching and acceptance. Stated
more completely, the flexibility of the process to match the circumstances of the dispute and be accepted by the parties. It is that acceptance, the flexibility of the process to match the circumstances
that account in large measure for the success of site-specific and
alternative dispute resolution, as a substitute, or as an adjunct, I
should say, for more formal procedures that might otherwise have
been used.
There are some key ingredients that I'd like to use as touchstones, to look at the unrecognized differences and unrecognized
similarities. In the interest of time, I'll name those categories in
the course of talking about the differences and similarities, rather
than stating them separately.
Contrast what happens in a site-specific dispute to what happens in an institutionalized system. In a site-specific dispute, the
parties typically want to negotiate. (We can certainly find exceptions to this and to all the principles that I will name.) It might
not be the parties' very favorite idea in the world-to negotiate
with those horrible folks on the other side of the table, but, for
reasons of risks that they face or reasons of time or frustration,
they're involved in the site-specific dispute resolution process because they have decided that they want to or are willing to
negotiate.
In contrast, when you institutionalize a system, you're often
requiring or insisting that parties come to the table to negotiate
who may not wish to do so; they may have better alternatives to
negotiation, they might wish to pursue things through the courts,
or through some other means, for those of you familiar with
Fisher and Ury's work in this field, Getting to Yes, 1 the parties may
1. R.
(1981).

FISHER & W. URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING WiTHOU
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have a better BATNA [best alternative to a negotiated agreement]
in the institutionalized system. In a situation that may arise under
the purview of the system, they might not be interested in
negotiating.
In a site-specific dispute the issues are known when we form
the process. We know what the issues are, we can attract the necessary parties around those issues and set up a negotiation process that will be able to deal with those issues.
In an institutionalized system where you're setting up rules
and regulations governing disputes that have not yet arisen, it's
very difficult to know what the issues are going to be. While it
may be a siting issue in each case, what are the underlying issues
in that dispute? Is it water pollution? Is it air pollution? Is it who
owns the property? Is it truck traffic? The issues may be very
different than the ostensible subject matter of the dispute and
what they will be is hard to predict in an institutionalized system.
Similarly, we can select the parties to match those issues in the
site-specific dispute. In an institutionalized situation, not knowing the issues means you can't select the parties ahead of time.
The selection of the parties is often prescribed in the statute or
the regulations so it may not be possible to get the proper parties
there. Moreover, it may be necessary to have parties there who
shouldn't be there. Even deciding on a mechanism by which you
would select the parties may be part of a realistic dispute resolution process. Participation can be problematic and has often
proven to be so.
In a site-specific alternative dispute resolution situation, the
parties typically have some kind of cohesion, so they can come to
the table and be represented in some relatively unified way. They
may have come together around a lawsuit, they may have come
together around activism of some kind, but the parties are sufficiently cohesive to participate in a negotiation. If I seek to compel parties to negotiate, which is often, but not always, the case in
an institutionalized system, they may or may not be sufficiently
cohesive to negotiate.
They may or may not have spokespersons available, and to
have a negotiation, someone has to be the spokesperson at the
table. The labor model, for example, makes that quite evident.
Without spokespersons, no one can bind the parties or mediate
within a party to bring the party together in order to facilitate
agreement. Agreement becomes very difficult. In an institutionalized system, if you don't know what the issues are, who the parPublished by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991
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ties are, or what the dispute is, it's up for grabs whether or not
there will be spokespersons available, or who can perform the
necessary functions of a spokesperson in negotiation or in a representative function.
Another important factor is the selection of the third party,
which is a common item in specific dispute resolution. In an institutionalized system, it's not clear whether or not the mediator will
be selected by the parties or sometimes provided for in some
other manner that may not necessarily fit the situation or be acceptable to the parties. Probably the most important thing in this
category is that the process and the ground rules fit the situation
in a site-specific mediation. For that specific situation, the process and ground rules for it are worked on by the parties and by
the mediator to fit the issues, to fit the parties, and often to fit the
politics of the situation.
That's much more difficult to do in an institutionalized setting, where we don't know the issues or the parties or the politics
that will exist for a particular dispute. More often than not the
processes that are established are generic kinds of processes unrelated to the kinds of issues that may arise. These tend to restrict the flexibility of the process to fit the specific circumstances
of the dispute. This takes away one of the primary strengths of
the site-specific dispute resolution: the flexibility to fit the
circumstances.
Finally, in this category, the form of the agreement will fit the
circumstances of a site-specific dispute. In an institutionalized
setting, the statute or the regulations frequently prescribe what
form the agreement which will be a better agreement for a particular dispute.
So the unrecognized differences between successful site-specific resolution and successful institutionalized alternative dispute
resolution are important things to recognize so that we can incorporate them and be cautious about them when we seek to design
a mechanism.
The other category which I will deal with involves the unrecognized similarities between site-specific alternative dispute resolution and institutionalized dispute resolution. Primarily, this
category centers on one particular aspect of the process: how the
system itself is developed. I'd like to put forth the notion that the
development of the institutionalized system itself, in a site-specific
dispute, and the ingredients that go into a successful site-specific
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol2/iss1/1
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dispute resolution must also go into the development of the
system.
Let me name a few of the elements as examples so we can
talk about more of them later on. In a site-specific dispute, as I
said earlier, you have to have spokespersons and representatives
of the parties. Typically, when we put together an institutionalized system, rather than spokespersons for the parties, we have
different people. The people that play a large role in putting it
together might be legislative staff or it might be attorneys (God
forbid) or might be professors (double God forbid) who play a
large role in describing what the structure of the system should
be. Settlements of these kinds of disputes need to represent the
reality of the situation and the'interest of the parties. Only principals of the parties can properly represent those interests and realities. It doesn't seem to work nearly as well when they are not
part of it. Having the right people there is paramount. Dispute
resolution also requires a strong "neutral." Typically, we don't
have a neutral to help shape the institutionalization process and
because institutionalized dispute resolution systems are often the
product of a legislative process or a regulatory process, the process itself may not fit the circumstances and the politics of the
situation and the needs of the parties. We may organize a legislative committee to explore institutionalization, which may exclude
key parties who may be using the system later down the road. It
may exclude important factors that might not occur to legislators,
legislative committees, or people who are working with them, so
we end up with an unreasonably unrealistic process.
In summary, it seems to me that there is value in using alternative dispute resolution procedures on a site-specific basis. It is
much more dangerous to try to impose ADR procedures on an
institutionalized basis because we lose many of the important
flexibilities. We lose the acceptance of the parties. We lose the
capacity to match the dispute resolution procedures to the specific process because we become compelled to institute generic
procedures that may not fit. Finally, it is that much more difficult
to institutionalize these processes in a way that works because
rather than being concerned with the direct parties to the dispute,
people who are really interested and have problems with the issue
and need to be part of the outcome, we end up with several indirect parties involved in the institutionalization, people who have
political interests, interests in due process and appearances.
These indirect parties insist on features of the mechanism that are
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991
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unrelated to its capacity to actually resolve disputes. That tends
to pollute the structure of the system and make it somewhat
unworkable.
So I would like to urge caution in institutionalizing dispute
resolution procedures that have proven useful in site-specific circumstances. Institutionalization is far more difficult.
For those of you who came to the conference expecting to
hear all about how valuable institutionalizing dispute resolution
is, you may find that this is very much like the anniversary card
that I got from my wife last year. She always sends me imaginative cards. On the front it says, "You're the answer to my
prayers." (Maybe some of you have gotten the same card.) When
you open it up it says, "You're not' what I prayed for, but you're
the answer that I got."
That's what happens sometimes when we try to institutionalize dispute resolution processes.
HENRY PERRITF:
Thank you, Jon. Leonard Charla.
LEONARD CHARLA:
Thank you, Hank.
Professor Perritt promoted me to Editor-in-Chief of the Catholic University Law Review. I wish he had been around twenty-four
years ago, but it's too late. I was active in the review, but not as
Editor-in-Chief.
It is a privilege to be here today. The issue of environmental
dispute resolution is going to be around a long, long, time. When
you open today's New York Times, and on the front page is news of
a major revelation of radioactive materials stored all over the St.
Louis metropolitan area, you see not only that the problem is going to be with us for a long time, but it's much bigger than anybody thinks. In the next eighteen months or so, keep your eyes
open for news about the Bureau of Public Lands. That's all I can
tell you now, but the word on the street is they have a large
number of sites, too.
The first thing I'd like to mention is that ADR does have
some limitations. I frequently run into people who indicate that it
is going to be a cure-all. It is not. It is a good, solid set of techniques that can minimize difficulties as applied to Superfund
[Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Lihttps://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol2/iss1/1

10

1991]

Editors: Alternative Methods of Resolving Environmental Disputes
SYMPOSIUM: ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

11

ability Act or CERCLA] sites, and can really help move things
along and save money if all the parties have an agenda to do that.
Often you'll find groups of people who have hidden agendum,
one of which is to delay the process. Because by delaying the process, "judgement day," the day in which they start paying to clean
up the site, is itself delayed. If that incentive to delay is present,
ADR is going to be less successful because these people come
with trunks full of monkey wrenches which they start flinging at
every opportunity. One of the things one has to look for injudging whether or not these techniques can be reasonably applied, is
whether the parties are willing to receive them. The next thing
(and Professor Brock touched upon it very briefly), is a notion
that causes a great deal of resistance to ADR: the notion that the
entire Superfund process provides a form of ADR, so you don't
need to superimpose any other structure. The Superfund process
is that the parties will negotiate and will eventually schmooze
themselves into a nice deal. However, this works very well at
some sites, while at other sites they're going to be in court for
years. The public welfare is really the victim because the site
doesn't get cleaned up as expeditiously as it could be. Better
techniques could be used, and I think that the parties who resist
them dogmatically cause some unfortunate outcomes.
The second view is that every site needs to receive ADR, and
let's put a structure on top of the site process. That has similar
results at the other end of the continuum-the process is
unsuccessful.
I like a more pragmatic approach which involves flexibility in
looking at the environment of the site itself, and attempting to
bring in those techniques which are going to be most successful
in achieving the end that the process seeks. This end is remediation: as speedily as possible, as completely as possible, as protectively as possible, and consistent with national goals and
objectives.
Another question you might want to think about-this is a
digression, but it has been raised and is going to be very important in our lifetimes-is whether the amount of money allocated
to remediating Superfund sites is being used wisely. Think about
whether Superfund money would be better allocated on clean air
or clean water or public housing. This is a public policy issue that
I think is going to be an increasing source of debate in the future.
The ADR processes that have been developed almost in response
to some of the statutory provisions are preauthorization-mixed
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991
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funding. That was new with SARA [Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act] in 1986. The government agrees to reimburse potentially responsible parties (PRP) who do all the work.
Then the government will proceed against other parties who have
"hidden in the weeds" during the Superfund process. That's
been used fairly successfully within EPA Region Three, headquartered here in Philadelphia. Region Three has two or three of the
mixed funding sites; however, there might be about six of them
now. At one of those mixed funding sites, a single PRP agreed to
front most of the money. By using mixed funding and negotiating for over a year with the region officials, with EPA headquarters, and with the Department ofJustice, about three and one-half
million dollars was saved on the cost of remediating the site. So it
was a case where the site got cleaned up quickly and where the
company got a good benefit in terms of having its cost reduced. I
think that's an example of an ADR technique working very well.
A second example is in the midwest, in EPA Region Five.
There, a surrogate for preauthorization-mixed funding avoids
long negotiation time, elaborate preparation, and intensive review in Washington, D.C. by EPA headquarters and Justice.
Some regions, rather than use the formal preauthorization process, have used what they call "surrogates for mixed funding" in
which they will agree to forgive a portion of the past response
costs that are imposed on the site in exchange for services or acts
to be done or foreborn by the potentially responsible party. At
one site in Region Five, the PRPs were able to save half a million
dollars in past response costs simply by agreeing to go forward
with some activities which the Region wanted but was loathe to do
itself. In the section 106 area, if the PRPs can successfully negotiate an administrative order by consent, they often will have a
smoother procedure, and a more effective and quicker clean-up,
than if they follow unilateral procedures.
These three areas are more or less SARA-specific and have
evolved since the passage of SARA. At the more conventional
sites, where parties utilize ADR, there have also been some significant successes. In the far west, in Region Nine, there is a vast site
that has thousands of PRPs. There the steering committee used a
system of subcommittees to handle a number of functions. These
functions included direct negotiations with Region Nine, negotiations among themselves, and community relations. There was a
legal committee, and there was a full-time manager. All of these
teams or committees resulted in a consent decree being achieved
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol2/iss1/1
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for the first operating unit at this site, more than a year ahead of
what might have happened had they simply permitted that region
to follow its nose in reaching settlement at that site. There are
other examples, as well, where third parties have been brought in
as formal "neutrals" to do allocation among the parties. People
were permitted to provide information, and comments on that
neutral's decision. That's much more like the classic ADR that
people talk about.
Of course, my company has done this at sites as well- with
some modicum of success.
These are ways in which ADR can be applied at sites. It isn't
a panacea. There is resistance to ADR because some groups like
to do it in a very expensive way. I think you need to take those
impediments out of the way, such as high costs, and look at what's
really happening. You need to specify the goals and objectives of
the steering committee and the government, and then, draw from
the vat of ADR techniques those techniques which are most likely
to be of assistance at the particular site. Thanks very much.
HENRY PERRITT:
Thank you, Mr. Charla. Lawrence Bacow.
LAWRENCE BACOW:
It's a pleasure to be here. I'd also like to thank the Dean and
Liz and the others who have arranged this good day for us, and
thank them for their hospitality in helping some of us get here
under difficult circumstances. It was, I must confess, pleasant,
and also humbling, to listen to Jon Brock's comments on the difficulties of institutionalizing alternative dispute resolutions. What
Jon didn't tell you is that one of the cases which he looked at quite
closely in arriving at his conclusions is the statute which I helped
draft in Massachusetts to institutionalize such procedures. I must
confess that the statute has not worked well. It has not worked
well for all the reasons that Jon has already told us. All I can say
is, "Jon, where were you ten years ago when we could have used
your good advice?"
I still think, as do all my colleagues on this panel, that alternative dispute resolution is a good thing. We've all talked about
it, but we haven't really spent much time describing it in our own
words. So let me first define it, and then explain why I think it's a
good thing, and why I think we ought to be nurturing it.
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991
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First, in my view alternative dispute resolution represents
face-to-face negotiation by the parties, by the principals involved,
the affected interests, in the attempt to come to grips with their
conflict. Sometimes they negotiate with the assistance of a "neutral," but without resort to the courts, although, obviously, that's
always lurking in the background.
Why do I think that's a good thing? Well, let me come at it
by telling you why I think litigation is a bad means of resolving
some of these disputes. The disputes that I've been involved with
are largely disputes where people want to build things, things that
often have the general property that society needs them, but nobody wants to live next to them: like hazardous waste facilities.
You have a proponent of a facility coming forward and saying,
"We're going to do something; we're going to do it right here.
We'd like your permission, government, to do it right here." And
you have a bunch of people who have the misfortune of living
next to it who say, "No, don't put it there."
When that issue is litigated, in the courts, the issue that you
get before the courts is typically a procedural issue as to whether
or not the administrative bodies took the appropriate steps and
actions, held the right hearings, whatever, in rendering their decision. Or, it's the adequacy of the environmental impact report
that was filed prior to the hearing. Usually neither of those issues
are of any real concern to the parties. The developer wants to
know ...

is that a good site? The people who live next to it, who

are usually going to be unambiguously worse off if it's built there,
notwithstanding the fact that it may be good for everybody else,
say, "No, it's a bad site and we don't want it there." They don't
really care about the adequacy of the impact statement; if you
could deliver the perfect impact statement, there are people who
would still oppose the facility.
So we have this strange set of circumstances: the issues that
the court really cares about tend to be of little real concern to the
parties, and the issue that the parties really care about, "Is that a
good site, should it go there, or someplace else?", is one with
which the court doesn't want to deal. This seems like we've got a
situation where ships are passing in the night and decisions are
being made in a context where the true underlying issues aren't
addressed. The parties can address the real issues themselves.
There is at least a chance that that can happen in a productive
way. Having acknowledged the difficulties which Jon has already
talked about, the real question becomes this: if we think that
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol2/iss1/1

14

1991]

Editors: Alternative Methods of Resolving Environmental Disputes
SYMPosIUM: ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

15

ADR is a good thing, but we also recognize the difficulties of institutionalizing it, how do we nurture it or alternatively, how do we
at least look at our administrative and procedural processes so
that we don't place obstacles in its way. We should not handcuff
the parties in their attempts to try and fashion solutions to their
own problems.
All that is in the way of introductory remarks. What I really
had intended to talk about is this problem of parties. One of the
nice things about litigation is that there is a beginning, a middle,
and an end. The problem with negotiation is that it really is a
classic seamless web. Negotiation and bargaining begin before
the parties sit down at the table. Unfortunately, it also continues
after there is an agreement. It's not a linear process: it's ongoing;
it continues. If we want to encourage people to negotiate, if we
want to play some role, as lawyers-as litigators, or mediators or
just officious intermeddlers, we need to recognize that characteristic of negotiation.
We need to think ahead and look at the process by which the
parties might bind themselves to an agreement. If those compliance issues are not anticipated in advance, then negotiation becomes a useless exercise. You will not get the parties to the table.
The parties will not invest their time, effort, and resources if they
think that, for whatever reason, the agreement they strike will not
be binding.
Environmental problems cause particularly vexing compliance issues. Not all deals are difficult to enforce in our lives, however. When I go to the flea market and pick out something and
haggle over the price and then buy it, there's not a compliance
problem and the reason is that the deal is closed on-the-spot.
Performance occurs mutually and simultaneously. In an environmental dispute that's never the case. Performance typically occurs, especially in the kind of site-specific disputes that we've
been talking about, over many, many years. I say, "Put it there,
it'll be alright, don't worry, we won't have these big problems
down the road, there won't be groundwater contamination
problems, there won't be air pollution problems, there won't be
noise problems, there won't be congestion problems"-and I'll
make certain types of assurances. People don't believe me when I
say that because performance occurs over long periods of time.
Nonperformance is not always obvious: it requires careful monitoring. The capacity of the institution that's making the promises
is often in question because one never knows whether it will be a
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viable enterprise five, ten years down the road. Moreover, a perception often exists that the kind of damages that will occur if
there is noncompliance will be in some sense fundamentally
irreversible.
The environmental site-specific disputes pose particularly
vexing compliance problems which need to be anticipated by the
parties in the negotiation process if they are to be successful.
Now there is a range of techniques that are available. There are
alternative approaches to resolving environmental disputes, alternatives to litigation that we can discuss. Let me stop there in the
interests of time.
HENRY PERRITT:
Thank you, Larry. Judge Simandle.
JUDGE SIMANDLE:
Thank you and good afternoon. I'm glad that so many of you
could make it on this day of inclement weather. I'd like to draw
your focus now to what's been called the most institutionalized
process of all. That, of course, is the federal court. I'd like to
speak with particular reference to litigation in federal court involving Superfund sites. Typically, the plaintiffs are the EPA or
the state. Sometimes it's private parties seeking contribution,
where the private party has come forward with a remedial plan
and is seeking contribution from other parties who may be potentially responsible. The object of the litigation is to recover the
response costs under CERCLA. Sometimes the object is to abate
a release of hazardous substances into the environment. But basically the object is to have money flow from one side of the table to
the other in order to redress harm that has been done and to prevent future harm.
Typically-and I think this is an important point-settlement
efforts have failed at the administrative level or they've never
been tried before the matter has come to court. There is, of
course, under Superfund, an entire administrative settlement
mechanism that takes place before the EPA. Demand letters go
out and the parties have an opportunity to negotiate and settle.
What I've seen from my vantage point in federal court, or what I
hear is that on increasingly numerous occasions the parties are
self-organizing at that early stage. If the settlement efforts before
the EPA are unsuccessful, they are not necessarily wasted. Those
efforts are sometimes picked up again in federal court. Somehttps://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol2/iss1/1
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times there is already an organizational structure of counsel in
place, parties have had an opportunity to identify themselves as
belonging to certain groups: generators, handlers, and owners
and operators; each of which with interests that diverge from that
of the government certainly, but also interests which may diverge
from each other.
It's my thesis that litigation can be managed in a way that
promotes settlement by achieving flexibility, fitness, and recognizing
an amenability of the litigants to settle the case. Judicial roles in the
settlement process span a wide spectrum. These roles range from
a pure adjudicator, a judge who has no role to play and stands
aside; up through a neutral manager who has no special settlement agenda, but if settlement is about to happen, then the neutral manager will help it to happen; to settlement process
manager which means the negotiations can be managed in a way
that helps to promote the opportunities for settlement without in
any way specifying what that settlement ought to be; through a
mediator, a person who functions with some degree of compulsion to bring the parties together, provide a forum and perform a
mediative role; and all the way up to the level of being an arbitrator who is more directed toward the results and the goals of the
process.
To say that a judge is helping to promote settlement doesn't
necessarily answer the question of which of these roles is the
judge playing. In my experience with federal court where magistrates do perform case management functions, I've played each of
these roles-at different times, in different Superfund cases. It's
often a question of timing.
Attorneys, similarly, are called upon to play a number of
roles. Sometimes they play the role of pure attorney, pure litigator, pressing hard to trial, always trying to gain the advantage,
doing more, faster, bigger, better, and pressing the adversary into
a corner. Often times they play the role of team litigator. That is
in multi-party cases with 50 to 500 parties in them, coalescing, at
least, for litigation purposes, in teams. One step further is the
hybrid litigator, someone who's litigating as part of a team, but,
also, is settling or trying to settle, trying to negotiate as part of a
team. The attorney as team player really comes into the fore in
this sort of a Superfund site litigation.
I think the purest settlement form involves someone I would
call the settlement counsel. This is an attorney who has been
brought in and retained by a group of parties for purposes of
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991
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helping them to achieve settlement. Sometimes settlement interests are being represented at the same time that litigation interests are going forward. When I talk about a settlement process in
federal court, it's often within the context of simultaneous litigation. Both things can be done at once, but I'm also eager to put
the brakes on the litigation process, to put the gas on the settlement end of the process in order to achieve the sort of timing that
promotes settlement.
Who decides whether there ought to be a settlement process? In my view the decision has to come from the players; it's
nothing that a judge can impose upon the process. In each case
where this has happened in my court, the first question to the
parties has been, "Is there a willingness among the parties to engage in good faith in a settlement process?" If there is a critical
mass willing to take that risk, whatever the risk may be of saying,
"Yes, I'm willing to engage in a settlement process," and as long
as the mass includes the plaintiff, the governmental authority, or
the party who brought the matter to court, then I'm willing to ask
a few more questions.
"What form should the process take?" There is no magic
formula to be imposed in each Superfund case. I've seen half a
dozen and each one has separate characteristics that would make
the process used in that case inappropriate for at least some of
the others. This type of dialogue, up front, helps to define what
the process ought to be. Let's consider advantages of court supervised settlement processes, as opposed to out of court
processes. Once you're in court there are not many choices. One
advantage is being able to select the remedy for the site, as part of
the negotiation. You can negotiate money, you can negotiate timing, you can negotiate the remedy. If the remedy is one that's
consistent with the governmental studies, the plans, the policies,
the statute, then you may have a hand in selecting the remedy.
I've seen dramatic instances of lower costs because of the opportunity for the negotiating and settling parties to select the remedy
and to convince the governmental authorities why their remedy
would work.
I won't mention the case, but you can believe me when I say
that I saw in one case, a 50% savings in a proposed remedy, and
perhaps even an improvement in the remedy that was selected.
The remedy that was selected was a privately-executed remedy.
This is well underway already.
Decreasing risk is another advantage. There's no risk of outhttps://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol2/iss1/1
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come when you settle. There's a long term risk in any Superfund
case, however, and I don't know that any process can do away
with that. Part of the risk is statutory. There are certain reopeners that have to be contained in any Superfund site settlement. Years down the road maybe some of these settlements that
I've been so pleased with may come back, but there are mechanisms for dealing with them if they come back.
Another obvious advantage is a lower transaction cost. Litigation with 50 or 100 or 200 attorneys is extremely expensive.
When I have a group of attorneys like that in a room, I hesitate to
stutter because I know that my stuttering like I just did is going to
cost some party somewhere substantial amounts of money. I'd
rather save the nuts and bolts of how it's done for later discussion
because my time is up.
One of the lessons that has to be learned is that the process
must fit the problem you're addressing. You don't want a situation where you have a settlement process that itself is
micromanaged, where there seems to be judicial involvement in
every nook and cranny of the settlement issue. You need things
to flow; you need flexibility; you need deadlines that are enforceable; you need good faith, compelled by court orders if it's not
forthcoming in terms of the giving of data. You need a confident
data base. Courts are good at making parties march to the beat of
the same drummer and removing the incentives for staying
outside of the process.
In terms of avoiding overkill you want to avoid the situation
that one of my attorneys mentioned. He said, "Judge, you know
what a good alternative dispute resolution process for this landfill
would be?" I said, "No." He said, "Well, it's what we have here,
you can have 300 attorneys and one guy with a backhoe."
HENRY PERRITIT:
Thank you, Judge Simandle. To begin the interactive part of
our program, I want to introduce my colleague, John Hyson, who
is sitting at your far right. John began his professional career at
Boston College, continued it at the University of North Carolina,
and he went back up to the Boston area and he received his law
degree from Harvard. John has been on the Villanova faculty
since 1971. He's been very innovative and creative, not only in
terms of exploring new teaching techniques, but also in terms of
getting environmental law usefully into the Villanova Law School
curriculum. In fact, much of the original credit for the level of
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activity that many of you as students or alumni have shown in the
environmental area goes to John Hyson for his willingness to
stimulate all of us to think about these things. John, because he
knows much more about environmental law than I do, agreed to
react to what the speakers have said and to begin our discussion.
John.
JOHN HYSON:
Thank you, Hank. Since we're in the discussion phase, it
would seem overly formal for me to get up there and begin to
pontificate, especially since I am reacting. I don't intend to try to
add to what has been said. Quite frankly, the people who are up
here and who have already spoken know much more about the
realities of this process than I do. As we were setting up this particular panel, we were trying to think of exactly what my role
would be, and I've been hard-pressed to think of it myself.
Thankfully, earlier on, one of the speakers, Larry Bacow, described my role and that, of course, is, "officious intermeddler."
In that role, I'd like to make an initial observation. We were
having fun with the characterization of the different speakers
about the extent to which they have been institutionalized. I am
amused because my reaction after listening to all the speakers, is
that the person who was identified initially as the most institutionalized seemed to be in no way bound by any formalities of the
institution in which he operates. I make that observation because
one of the questions that I had intended to ask Judge Simandle
was the extent to which he felt bound by the constraints of the
formalized institution within which he operates. I would like to
suggest what I think is the answer, and I would invite others to
comment upon it. It seems to me that the answer that I will now
put inJudge Simandle's mouth, is that he doesn't feel bound at all
by any constraints. When he's faced with a difficult multi-party
Superfund site, the fact that he is operating as a United States
Magistrate doesn't seem to impose any kind of constraints in
Judge Simandle's mind upon how he can deal with this difficult
situation. Do you want to just say, "Yes, I'm correct", orJUDGE SIMANDLE:
I learned a long time ago that my law school professors were
always correct. There are certain constraints within the process.
There's always the constraint of due process. There's always the
constraint of treating people fairly, and there's a constraint of not
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol2/iss1/1
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depriving any party of its day in court. There are plenty of litigants in Superfund cases, like any other case, who don't want any
part of a settlement process; they want their day in court. They
want the case managed, understandably so, so that one day they
can have a trial, or have a summary judgement that would establish that they should not be in the case. That insistence may also
come from the Government. The Government may feel in certain
cases and with certain litigants that it has a slam-dunk, and
doesn't want to be detoured to a settlement process.
So the very first constraint that I experience is whether a settlement agenda is on a collision course with the way that the litigation ought to be handled. Some cases, just plain flat out ought
to be litigated. I'm not saying every case ought to be managed for
settlement. I think that does a disservice to some parties. That's
why the first point that I mentioned was the need for consensus
among the litigants that there ought to be a settlement process.
I wouldn't seek to impose that, but the lack of constraint is a
good point. In a settlement process I'm free to expose myself to
the merits because I'm not a judge who is going to try the case.
The district judge wouldn't normally be informed of any of the
settlement discussions. I can engage in ex-parte conversations
with the litigants in a settlement process. That's one of the rules
that's put into place at the outset, while in normal litigation, of
course, I would never do that. The Federal Rules were amended
in 1983 to build in this kind of flexibility, to call time-out in the
rest of the case to explore settlement. I think Rule 16 and Rule
26(F) are powerful amendments to the rules that give a judge who
wants to take control over either case management or settlement
the tools that he or she needs to do so.
JOHN HYSON:
I don't want to monopolize the questioning here, but I just
wanted to follow up what Judge Simandle has said. What are the
advantages that a United States Magistrate can bring to a situation where informal efforts of negotiation have already failed?
What have you brought to this situation that wasn't there before,
that didn't allow a successful negotiation to be reached before
formal involvement of the federal Court?
JUDGE SIMANDLE:
Well, I wouldn't want to take credit for the settlements that
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are achieved in the federal courts. I think that the lawyers and the
parties they represent deserve that credit.
It's often a question of timing. In the pre-litigation phase,
there's often not an opportunity for everyone to be in the same
place at the same time. That opportunity comes in the courthouse. You can exchange any number of ugly letters with an adversary, pre-litigation, but once you have to sit down across the
table from that adversary in the courthouse, there can be a certain
chemistry, a magic almost. It can happen if there's an environment of trust. I know that that sounds corny, but you can't
achieve a settlement without some degree of trust or somehow
mediating mistrust. The magistrate, as a judicial officer, once the
parties have decided upon the mechanism for settlement, has advantages that an arbitrator might not have. If the magistrate has
some sort of technical training or technical background, that's a
plus. A number of our judges and magistrates have engineering
degrees. I do too. That can be helpful.
A couple litigants have said that there's a mystique to the
courthouse. Sometimes people have come into the courthouse
with the idea that a settlement will be achieved, and that's something that doesn't happen outside. But you cannot simply assume
that all of these things are going to happen. You cannot assume
that without some sort of direction that a settlement's going to
occur. That hasn't been my experience either.
Being a listener, you take your direction from the litigants
and build consensus.
There's plenty of attorneys now, and I see some of them in
this room, who achieve more and have more experience in these
sorts of cases. They know how to do it. It's what makes this process very exciting. Frankly, I'm flattered that you would give up a
Saturday afternoon to be here ...
HENRY PERRIT-:
I wonder if I could jump in at this point, and ask the other
panelists to comment on an observation that might be inferred
from some of what Judge Simandle said in his prepared comments, and also fromJon Brock's initial criteria. One of the difficulties in talking about ADR is that there's lurking in the
background the possibility that ADR works only in the universe of
disputes that were going to settle anyway. So maybe the successes of ADR, are only the easier portions of the dispute. Those
that aren't so easy end up with Judge Simandle and maybe they
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol2/iss1/1
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don't even get settled by him through negotiation, but they're the
cases that go to trial.
JONATHAN BROCK:
Perhaps I can start on that, Hank. I wouldn't characterize it
as the easy ones, or otherwise, people like me, who think they are
good at resolving disputes would be out of business. It depends
on the goodness of the fit within the dispute. There are some
disputes that are amenable to mediation because of the kind of
dispute that they are, because of the parties, because of the kind
of trust that exists, because of how much failure there's been
before, a whole range of factors is involved.
Others just won't resolve. The most common kind of issue,
at least in the labor relations business, is a personality issue. It's
rarely the money that won't let you settle it, it's more likely that
somebody has hated somebody for years. Going to an arbitrator
doesn't settle the feud, but mediating it and dealing with what
may be underlying that personality dispute, that historical dispute, may be the more likely way to do it. It doesn't mean it was
easier, but it means that the tool fit the problem. Discriminating
among cases, as Judge Simandle described, is one of the most important functions in deciding whether or not alternative dispute
resolution is a proper process.
Another thing that I would underline is one that I mentioned, and that the Judge's comments reminded me about once
again. This is the necessity for those who are interested in alternative dispute resolution processes not to think that it's a substitute for litigation or a substitute for civil procedures, or any other
more formal mechanisms that people are used to confronting.
There's a security in those mechanisms, and there is a specification of rights. Whether you think the other party has too many
rights or not depends on what side you're on. Those things are
very important to individuals. It's important to the society, and
ADR needs to be one of the tools in the arsenal. It has been my
judgement in the past in the observations that I've made that
ADR works best when it is one of the tools at the disposal of both
the parties and persons who are assisting the parties. This is still
a reasonably new field, but I'm sure this is to be true for all time.
Dispute resolution professionals, eight or ten years ago, thought
that ADR was going to be a substitute for litigation and that everybody should use it. I think it's terribly important for a group
like this interested in these issues to begin to think about the fact
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that it's much better not as its own system, but as a set of tools
available along with systems that provide security and rights.
Whether ADR gets used more than the others is a different matter, but to separate it from the existing procedures, at least in a
sudden way, is very dangerous and probably doesn't serve the interests of the parties or people who think this is a good process to
use. Larry said he wishes I were around. He wasn't happy when I
was examining him on his dissertation at some seminar, I remember, but we've gotten over that and we've been friends ever since.
LAWRENCE BACOW:
Hank, I would just like to ask a rhetorical question. What
should be a supplement to what? Is ADR a supplement to litigation or vice-versa? Let the group think about, to try and envision,
a world that looks a little bit different than the one that we have
here now. There are other societies who manage to address the
same sorts of issues without the same degree of intense involvement of the courts. In those other societies, which are democratic
societies, people feel like their rights are not being trampled
daily. Though the expectation is that disputes of this sort will be
settled in one form or another by negotiation among parties, that
does not mean to suggest that litigation isn't available or that
some cases don't go to litigation. But the mix is very different
from the way we have it here. I only offer that as a point to ponder, at least. Is the tail wagging the dog or vice-versa?
JUDGE SIMANDLE:
Can I just follow-up on that? What Larry just said reminded
me of something that Jonathan Brock said in his comments.
Jonathan, at the end of your comments you referred to the development of an institutionalized system of dispute resolution as itself being a kind of site-specific dispute. You talked about the
different participants in developing an institutionalized system of
dispute resolution. In setting up any kind of institutionalized system of dispute resolution, one can expect that among the participants in setting up that system will be people who have been
trained as lawyers. At one point you referred to notions of due
process. Someone says due process and the people in this room,
or many of the people in this room, think very positive thoughts.
After all, that's embodied in the' Fourteenth Amendment. I think
when you refer to due process, you're referring to it in a kind of
negative way. You're suggesting that perhaps lawyers' notions of
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol2/iss1/1
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due process causes them to think about a dispute resolution process in a way that is counter-productive.
Now, did I put a whole lot of words into your mouth or did I
misunderstand you completely? Do lawyers and basic notions
that lawyers have about dispute resolution mess up effective ways
of resolving multi-party disputes?
JONATHAN BROCK:
As one of the probably five non-lawyers in this room, I'm
looking carefully for the back door before I answer this question
because I want to answer it frankly. The answer in simple terms
is, "Yes." You can tell me more about the type of training and
experience that lawyers have. Other people are products of their
own experience as well. In the cases that I study, I feel like I'm on
reasonably safe ground. If I don't tell you what the cases were,
then I can claim full knowledge and a monopoly on the knowledge. In the cases that I looked at, when it came down to trying
to develop the institutionalized system, the folks who really impeded the deal were people whose rhetoric, at least said, we are
worried about due process. We are worried about the public having its opportunity to be involved properly in the process. We
would insist upon representation, would insist upon restrictions
in the process. They insisted upon requirements in the process,
that reminded me of litigation. Since I'm not an attorney, maybe
litigation doesn't have any of these things in it, but it sure looked
like it, and reminded me of administrative procedures that were
familiar to me when I worked in the federal government.
The way I use the term due process was meant to indicate
that the due process considerations weren't necessarily protection
of peoples' rights, although I'm sure they would have had that
function, but they were protecting a set of traditions that were
familiar and comfortable to individuals whose job it was to use
those traditions. In looking at ADR and hearing Judge Simandle's remarks today, which I've been impressed with and have enjoyed, there seems to me to be other ways to protect appropriate
due process rights. Larry's rhetorical question (as a professor,
I'm probably allowed to answer rhetorical questions) suggested
that we might be better off if we looked like some other society, or
it might be better if we looked like something else. Probably
that's true, although that would change the wage rates in your
business a bit. In the meantime, because people are used to certain kinds of due process protection to get them involved in ADR
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while throwing the life preserver to the other side of the ship, is
going to be difficult. They won't have anything really to cling to.
We say due process protection often when we mean well. ADR,
in the particular examples the Judge gave, suggest very strongly
that the parties will release themselves from those processes temporarily or for a time under a protective umbrella. They can
often give better results when they eliminate the things that really
aren't protecting due process rights in a strong sense; they are
only protecting traditions or habits that die hard. I'm not against
them dying hard. However, until we're convinced that what we
have to substitute for them, ADR will be just something professors thought up and wrote some articles about. We should get
some experience with these things before we start to move out of
the way the things that have served us reasonably well, even if
they're anachronisms which many of them are.
LEONARD CHARLA:
One of the things we're discussing that interests students is a
diversion in the activities of some lawyers from the objectives and
goals of their clients. If you take the Superfund process, which is
the process with which I am most familiar, you can see this on the
part of every single party including the federal government, the
states, the owners, the past owners, the operators-the PRPs. It
is everywhere. It is a good thing at the beginning of any proceeding in which one is going to represent a client to think about what
the client's interests really are in terms of the environmental dispute that one is handling. You might get a different result if you
say to oneself, "How am I going to take care of that turkey on the
other side, whom I've disliked for a long time? I'll stick it to
them." Very often this doesn't result in the outcome your client
really wants, at least not as fast or as inexpensively as they might
want it.
HENRY PERRITT:
In that regard I'd like to ask Larry Bacow to share with you an
example of an ad hoc site-specific solution to a compliance dilemma that he was involved in designing. There is a common
theme here. It has to do with creativity in terms of perceiving
what the client's interest really is and creativity in finding a way to
supplement the procedures people are more comfortable with.
Larry certainly has a concrete example that doesn't require us to
look at another society. It happened in this society.
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LAWRENCE BACOW:
We are trained as lawyers. Think about our first-year curriculum. We take contracts, we take procedure, we think about how
one enforces contracts. There tends to be a certain knee-jerk reaction as to how we enforce agreements. Part of that comes because it's comfortable. We know what the rules are: they're welldefined, and it's also easy. If you cut a deal with somebody and
something goes wrong, who's going to enforce it?
But I think that if we think hard and scratch our heads hard,
often we can craft the agreement itself in such a way, so that it
stands a chance of being self-executing. I think this is the case
that Hank asked me to talk about.
The case involved the expansion of a municipal landfill in
southeastern Massachusetts. There were a whole bunch of issues.
The developer-owner of the landfill wanted to expand it on land
that was owned by the town. The land was not really being used
for anything else and couldn't be used for anything else, but there
were several people who lived around the landfill who didn't want
to see the landfill get any larger. They were concerned about a
host of issues that went way back in terms of the relationships
between the parties. The last issue that had to be dealt with was a
problem of litter. Anytime you dump garbage on a site, it's supposed to be covered with fill on a daily basis. That prevents birds
from getting at it and also prevents the wind from blowing the
litter around. This was a problem, and the question was how to
ensure that the operator of the landfill complied with the requirement that the site be adequately covered every night. Of course,
coverage is expensive for the landfill operator. He's got to buy
fill, there are labor costs involved in moving the stuff around, he's
got to stop his work each day and leave enough time in order to
be able to cover it, so there's a big incentive for him not to do
that. He can save money on the deal, if he can.
What we crafted, in that particular case, was a procedure in
which the landfill operator paid money each year into a fund.
This fund was placed under the control of the public works department of the town. The purpose of the fund was to front
clean-up expenditures of wind-blown litter on the site, if there
was a litter problem. The money was there so that the town could
go clean the litter up at the expense of the landfill operator. So
far it's relatively straight forward. Then we stipulated that any
money that was left in that account at the end of the year would
be split between the town and the landfill operator. If the town
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didn't spend it all, it got to keep some for itself, but it had to
share in those savings with the landfill operator.
Mechanically, if there was a litter problem the town was supposed to notify the operator there was a problem and that they
were going to make use of the funds in order to clean up the
problem. Think about it. First of all it gave the town the capacity
to do something about the problem as opposed to just complaining to somebody else, going to a judge and saying, "They
are not doing what they said they were going to do; judge, please
help us out." Second, it created an incentive for the landfill operator actually to do what they were supposed to do under the
agreement: cover the site every night. To the extent they did that
then money was available at the end of the year and they were
going to see some of it back.
It also created an incentive for the town not to engage in nuisance actions with respect to the landfill operator, to complain
constantly, or to tap these funds constantly. What they didn't use
for clean-up, they got to keep half for themselves, at the end of
the year.
That's an example of how, if the parties really scratch their
heads hard and be creative and inventive, they can imagine ways
in which not only can people be brought together, but they can be
brought together in a way which won't necessarily push them toward the courthouse door in the future. I think that as lawyers,
we do our clients a disservice if we do not think about how the
deal which we have cut under the mat will be implemented in the
future. I think we have an obligation to do that.
HENRY PERRI-fT:
As we move along let me encourage any member of the audience to raise their hand and jump in with questions or comments.
LEONARD CHARLA:
Sometimes one finds diversity of interests within groups
themselves. For example, ideally the state or the federal government at sites should have the same goals, but frequently they do
not. Sometimes the citizens fight among themselves about
whether they want a quick remedy or a very thorough remedy.
It's not unknown for PRPs to fight vehemently; not only over
shares, but also over methods of procedure and timing. I do believe that you can get sites to settle and parties to come together
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even when they are at each other's throats if the right things are
added.
There was a suit in Michigan in which the government really
wasn't being very effective in proceeding with the remediation
and the parties were fighting like cats and dogs. Common counsel was brought in who had real skills as a peacemaker. By appealing to the mutual best interests of the PRPs he was able to
forge unity there. He then took that unity and used it to add
value to the process by taking it to the federal government and
offering to expedite the design problems at the site. That, in
turn, galvanized the federal government to go forward. The state
was still out there, fighting for reasons entirely its own, opposing
just about everything. Both the federal government and the PRPs
got together with the state and with common counsel and were
able to persuade people within the state government to join in a
good settlement that was adequately protective to the site.
Popularly, people see this as a battle where the PRPs are always looking for low cost quick and dirty clean-ups, but very often
that isn't the case. Very often it's a question of how much time
it's going to take or what sorts of contaminants are going to be
cleaned up and when. There is a body of PRPs out there who still
don't want to pay nickel one. There are other people around who
are interested only in making names for themselves. So you do
get base motives, but I think most of the time you can use these
ADR techniques to appeal to people's best interests, and to forge
resolution of some of the problems. It will never solve everything, but I think we're here today because collectively as a society we're on to something good with these ADR techniques.
JOHN HYSON:
I just wanted to comment on the suggestions of a sharp distinction between cases which involve integrative bargaining, or
integrative bargaining opportunities, and those that don't. In reality, the world is not so neat. Even in cases where there is an
opportunity for integrative bargaining, once you've created the
joint gains, they still have to be divided up between the parties,
which leaves you with a distributive problem at that point. There
may be some cases that are purely zero sum, but even in those
cases that aren't, you still have to settle the zero sum component
after you've created integrative opportunities. You're always
dealing with that problem, even in cases that look as if they are
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easy. Ultimately you still have to get down to the question of how
you're going to distribute these joint cases.
JONATHAN BROCK:
In some ways the more complex the dispute, the more that
ADR offers you because it's shaped to fit the situation; so you can
get tools that fit. The more complicated and difficult it is, the
more we should look to ADR either in judicial or non-judicial
contexts.
One of the difficulties in lots of disputes is the people who
are disputing are the people who have the problem. Sometimes
the people who have some access to the solution are parties who
aren't there. One issue that I'm close to, but not personally involved in at the moment, is one of airport noise at the SeattleTacoma airport. For a long time they had a group of citizens who
moved near the airport who were getting together under the auspices of the airport manager to talk about what should be done
about the airport noise. They came up with this marvelous list of
solutions that the airlines should do this; the FAA should do that;
flights should fly over those other communities over there. Of
course, everything they came up with went over like a lead balloon in the Seattle-Tacoma metropolitan area and nothing happened. It was terribly frustrating for everybody involved. Then a
new ADR initiative was put together, and people who are organizing it went to the airlines, went to the FAA, went to a number of
other parties, business groups and so on, who rely on the airport
for commerce and transportation needs. They involved a bunch
of parties, particularly the airlines and the FAA who are the only
parties really who can do something about it, and they appealed
to their community interests and to their economic interests.
They brought in people who were potentially part of the solution.
I think it's important to think about if you want to resolve it.
You have to get the parties who have some access to the elements
of solution. As one of my colleagues, Jerry Cormick, whose activities are reported in some of Professor Perritt's research on rulemaking says, "sometimes you have to make the problem bigger in
order to find the solution to it." ADR gives you that opportunity
more than more traditional procedures. We need to think of
ADR as a way to make the problem bigger, so that there's more
stuff to divide up and more stuff to trade. Of course, often what's
initially on the table, does present us with a very difficult problem
of dispute resolution. Trying to make it bigger may not seem like
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such a good idea, but we often get much closer to a solution if we
do make it bigger.
MEMBER OF AUDIENCE:
I'd like to present what might be as big an environmental
problem as anybody can come up with. We can still not agree on
a site for the disposal of nuclear waste. In the process thus far a
government agency identifies what it thinks is a potentially best
site. As soon as the news passes down, an enormous barnstorm
of opposition starts in the local community. "No way are you going to put it here." The opposition in many cases has nothing to
do with the geological merits or the technological merits of
whether it's safe. If there is any risk whatsoever-and naturally
there is going to be some risk with any activity-you're not going
to put it close to us, even though it might be more dangerous if
you put it close to somebody else. I'm wondering if it wouldn't be
more intelligent if the federal government would identify ten or
twelve of those geological sites. Then simply call everybody in to
say, "Look, we know that nobody here wants to be near the site
selected. In all probability, one of you is going to be the site selected. Let's see if you can work out some arrangement on what
the proper criteria are and proper safeguards are. Let's see if we
can come to some sort of conclusion on a basis that's fair to everybody." Now, maybe something like that would be totally unwieldy but I've just put forth one of the biggest problems I can
imagine, and I'd like to get a response to it.
HENRY PERRITT:
Well, the question has certainly taken Jon Brock up on his
invitation to consider expanding the dispute, because generally
that expands it as broadly as possible. But I think that's an important thread through some of the recent questions and comments,
I'd like to try to make it more explicit.
The tendency is to talk about ADR as though it were an alternative to litigation. I would submit that that's not really what
we've been saying here. What we've been saying is that we need a
set of alternative tools that are alternatives to the traditional
model of a lawsuit which has two parties-parties that are individuals. In fact, the range of tools that are interesting are those that
permit us to deal with disputes that are in some sense political.
That is to say that they are disputes involving parties that themselves are not individuals but are made up of multiple interests.
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Within each party you have an enormous number of disputes
which are not even visible within the constituency. What we really
have when we're talking about alternative dispute resolution is a
search for the most appropriate kinds of tools, to deal with political disputes which somehow are not resolvable through the traditional legislative and administrative rule-making mechanisms.
JONATHAN BROCK:
Well, shall we fix the nuclear waste dispute thing as long as
we're here?
LAWRENCE BACOW:
The problem that you described is a problem that exists for
all types of siting problems. It happens to be larger in scale, but
it's not different in kind from the problem of finding a site in Massachusetts for a hazardous waste recycling facility. One of the
things that the disputes have in common is that as much as you
may want to argue that a particular site may be a poor one for a
nuclear waste repository, it's tough for anybody to argue that we
shouldn't have a nuclear waste repository. No matter what your
attitudes are with respect to nuclear power, we've got the waste,
we've got to put it someplace, we've got to do something with it.
What we did in Massachusetts in the statute which I was involved
with, and it hasn't worked well...
JONATHAN BROCK:
...and I'll tell you why when he's done...
LAWRENCE BACOW:
We can talk about why it hasn't worked. It's very much along
the lines of your suggestion. The statute provides for identification of multiple sites, not a single site, but multiple sites. Moreover, the statute is designed to keep as many sites alive as long as
possible. The statute then contemplates a process by which the
communities organize themselves and participate in the negotiation process structured by the statute. It makes resources available to communities so that they have access to technical
assistance because these are highly technical conversations, and it
is fundamentally unfair to expect a community to come in and
then negotiate about all sorts of stuff dealing with geology and
hydrology and whatever if they don't have access to some of their
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol2/iss1/1

32

1991]

Editors: Alternative Methods of Resolving Environmental Disputes
SYMPOSIUM: ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

33

own technical expertise. It also provides-and this was really the
key piece of the statute-for a process by which the communities
would be compensated for their willingness to accept a site. What
was envisioned at the time of the drafting of the statute was that
some clever developer would come along and in effect conduct an
auction among the communities. The expectation was that they
would be able to get the communities, at least one community, to
articulate the set of benefits that they would need in order to
compensate them for the social costs that come from living next
to one of these things. As you correctly observe, with everything
comes some risk. If all you're getting are risks and costs and
nothing else, then clearly you're worse off if it goes next to you,
so you might as well have it go someplace else and so you'll fight.
So the statute provided for multiple sites under consideration simultaneously, technical assistance to the community, a process
for nomination of a compensation and a process for negotiation
of a compensation agreement between the developer and the
community.
Now why has that not worked? There are a variety of reasons
one of which has to do with the economics of the business
whereby no single developer of one of these facilities could afford
to compensate a community. Then the question is, should the
state have become involved as well? Some of us argued that yes
that was an appropriate role for the state because public goods
were being provided by one of these facilities. Such a facility
would diminish the amount of illegal dumping and temporary
storage of this stuff in a number of diffuse locations. But that has
never happened for a whole variety of political reasons. There
were other problems that became evident in the statute itself. Ultimately, I think if we are going to site one of these facilities, the
only way it will be sited is if there is compensation that is paid to
the community. Then the question really is what form does that
compensation take, and who's going to bear the cost of it.
JONATHAN BROCK:
I feel compelled to say something after Larry described that
awful statute. We're avoiding your question, I think, fairly artfully
like academics and panelists who have learned to do it well. If this
were a problem that our collective knowledge could resolve, we'd
be somewhere getting paid $400 an hour today solving it rather
than being here.
Larry's willingness to look at the Massachusetts statute objecPublished by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991
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tively and to understand its weaknesses says a lot about Larry's
capacity for inquiry.
In my judgement the reason why it didn't work had to do
with the principle that I articulated at the end of my remarks.
Leaders of the constituencies likely to be involved in those disputes were not properly involved at the beginning in the way in
which the mechanism was developed. My memory is a little bit
fuzzy on this, but as I recall, the legislature that passed the law
said, "We're going to organize a committee that's going to come
up with a mechanism." What they did is what happens very often
in public policy when we're trying to solve an important public
policy problem. We round up the usual suspects. We got a citizen, somebody who is sort of active in a citizen's group like the
League of Women Voters or in a government association or
something. We got an environmentalist, and we got a business
person. We didn't necessarily get people who could speak for
those constituencies on this set of issues.
Two things happened. One is that the mechanism that developed did not reflect either the political, the technical or business
economic reality of siting the facility. The mechanism, even
though the compensation aspect of it was interesting, and there
were a number of interesting aspects to it, wasn't the stuff that
came from the parties. Germane to Judge Simandle's remarks, it
was the stuff that came from legislative staff and professors. I
think it's useful to have legislative staff and professors involved in
discussions because we can tell you what happened someplace
else and what worked and what failed, but the mechanism has to
be a product of the parties. The parties that could do that weren't
necessarily there. Some were and some weren't.
The second result was that when the mechanism was ready to
be used to site hazardous waste facilities, we did not have leaders
go out to their constituencies, for example, a mayor who was wellregarded among other mayors, to say, "Look, we really have to
accept this. This is the best mechanism you can come up with and
we really need to settle these disputes." There was nobody to go
out and demonstrate leadership in the relevant communities, no
one to gain acceptance for what was inevitably going to be a controversial mechanism to use on a controversial set of issues. A
primary weakness of a lot of these attempts at institutionalization
was true in Massachusetts.
Of course, it's easy to look back at it. It's not easy to invent
these things so they work.
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The other thing is, I take issue with a comment that Larry
made. Even though it might be evident to those of us who follow
public policy issues, that yes, there needs to be a place to dump
this stuff, it is not evident to everybody in every community next
to whose home it may be located. In my state (Washington), if
you don't use nuclear power, you don't give a damn where they
put the stuff. It doesn't matter to you, you use hydroelectric
power, you use coal-fired plants or whatever you use, or you don't
care. I don't think that in Massachusetts, except among people
who were environmentally conscious or involved in public policy
in one way or another, that there was a widespread recognition of
the problem. I think that that's probably true with respect to nuclear waste. It hasn't leaked into my water supply, we haven't had
a crisis or a tension-producing event-a reason to coalesce people
around necessity. It's the coal mining theory of regulation. We
got a lot of coal mine regulation only after there were a bunch of
mine disasters. Unless there's a recognition of the problem and
tension that drives the parties together to find some better solution, it's hard to create a mechanism that will work. If you don't
consider carefully how you bring the parties together to discuss it,
and there's not an imperative that will bring the right parties
there to discuss it in the right way, then you're not going to solve
these kinds of problems. I don't care what ADR theory you use or
what litigation you'use. We can delay anything through litigation
if we feel strongly enough about it for quite a long time, and certainly you can stall it through ADR.
Without the right people there and without a sense that the
issue does have to be solved, it's very easy not to solve it. My view
is that the nuclear waste issue suffers from both of these
deficiencies.
LEONARD CHARLA:
One of the difficulties of saying, well, you've got to have the
right people there, is that it's not obvious at the time, who the
right people are.
JONATHAN BROCK:
Exactly.
LAWRENCE BACOW:
I think it's worth taking two minutes just to relate how this
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statute got passed because it's a wonderful story, even though it
has nothing to do with what we're talking about. Massachusetts
has been trying to site a hazardous waste facility for years. The
way they decided to go about doing it in 1978 was to hire a consulting firm, Arthur B. Little, to survey the state and find the geologically best site. It wasn't just based upon geology and
hydrology, but also on access and a number of criterion. It was
your typical consultant's task: take a set of criteria, go out and
survey all 351 towns and cities in Massachusetts. There's no unincorporated land in Massachusetts, so every piece of dirt in Massachusetts is in a city or town. The consulting firm rank ordered
all 351 in order of this multi-attribute utility function to determine where the best site was. They drafted their report, and
somebody leaked the results of the report. By the way, there was
a bill that was proceeding through legislature at the time. The
function of the bill was to override local autonomy, to override
the local legislative power to prohibit the state from constructing
one of these facilities in a local community. That was the history
of our efforts in the state; each time the state wanted to put it
someplace, local regulations and zoning stopped it. Anytime a
private developer wanted to do it, the locality would use its private police powers to prohibit it. So the purpose of the study was
to find the best site and the legislature was going to pass the local
override bill.
The top five sites get leaked to the press prior to the publication of the study. And what happens? The state representatives
from those five communities introduce an amendment to the
override bill, to statutorily exempt those communities from consideration as sites-making it illegal to site one there. Guess what
happened? The amendment passed.
It was then that people woke up and said, "There's no way
that we're going to site these kinds of facilities in Massachusetts
with state override because even if you succeed in passing an
override bill, individual localities, once it is clear that it is their ox
that is going to be gored, will marshall the political resources necessary to amend the override. So then people said, "Well, what
do we do now?"
At this point, there were several professors who had been
working on the problem, and we said, "Well, we have another
idea. The last one didn't work, why don't we try this? Okay?"
There was a special legislative commission. You know, the legislature tends to use the Noah's Ark approach to these sorts of
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things: two of this, two of that, two of that, and so it casts the net
quite broadly. They scratched their heads and said, "Who ought
to be involved?" So, you've got the Associated Industries of Massachusetts, you've got the Massachusetts Municipal Association.
Everybody looks around as Jon says, and you round up all the
usual suspects. They do their best. What's the old line about the
legislative process being like sausage? You shouldn't watch either
being made. What emerged was this statute which was not perfect. But that's what happened.
It's very, very difficult. Indeed, I would challenge Jon or anybody else, if we were to craft one of these processes today, in
advance, to know who ought to be at the table. As Jon has
pointed out, it is very difficult to anticipate until you know what
the dispute is and who the affected interests really are. That's
what makes this fundamentally a very difficult process to institutionalize in any formal way.
I think that when you deal with a situation, the first and most
important thing is making sure that the parties on both sides want
to reach a resolution. There has to be an externality that requires
alternative dispute resolution. If there's not an externalitysomething or somebody to put two people in a room, requiring
them to reach a solution for some reason-they're not going to
have a solution. Think about Judge Simandle. His externality is
that he's a judge and can go to trial. He may have other externalities that will say, "If you don't solve the problem, the EPA's going
to jump in and do something that may not work." Another externality in the Massachusetts situation is that the state has decided
that the facility is going to be located there. "Now you citizens,
the only thing you can do, is decide what is the best way for it to
go in that location." If you give the citizens the opportunity to
say no, then their position is going to be no, and you are never
going to have an opportunity to reach an agreement. The lesson
to the story which I just told about the first statute is that there's
no way that you can take away the power of the citizens to say,
"No." If they have felt that power, then the question is, can you
create an incentive for them to say, "Yes?"
The way in which I think that should be done is by crafting a
compensation agreement, giving them some reason why they
would want it there. Massachusetts missed the boat on siting a
hazardous waste facility recently. The first facility that was proposed was for solvent reprocessing. You take solvents to clean
printed circuit boards, which we manufacture a lot of, and once
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you clean the circuit boards, the solvent is contaminated. It becomes a hazardous waste. The way you recycle it is basically to
distill the stuff. It's very straight forward. Massachusetts needed
a place to put it and that's what everybody was objecting to in the
first two or three proposals to site facilities in Massachusetts
under the new statute.
Let me offer you an illustration of how you can now get the
community to say yes. Four years ago, Massachusetts was looking
for an in-state site for a micro-computer chip center. This was
going to be a new place in Massachusetts that was devoted to developing new technologies in the manufacturing of chips. There
were several communities in Massachusetts that were eager to
have it located there. There was a big political fight between
Westboro and Tauton to see which community would get it, with
everybody lobbying the governor. The way it should have been
handled is this: the governor should have announced, "This is
going to be a state of the art chip technology center manufacturing facility. We're going to design into it the technology to
reprocess the solvents that are being contaminated at this site. By
the way, it is economic for us to design this facility to be a little bit
bigger to accommodate more than just the solvents that are contaminated on that site. It's going to have to take solvents that are
contaminated from other sites as well." Then we would have had
our first solvent reprocessing center in Massachusetts.
So, if you had bundled the goodie with the baddie, we would
have had some chance of getting inside it.
MEMBER OF AUDIENCE:
I submit to you that the people were hot to have that chip
center because of jobs. With the separate solvent reprocessing
facility there weren't many jobs. With the chip technology center
there were lots. That's what people want, jobs and tax write-offs.
HENRY PERRITT:
It seems to me that maybe the two of you don't disagree as
much as you both suggest. In both cases you seem to be talking
about some kind of external creation of options.
JONATHAN BROCK:
I've been playing with that due process concept in my mind.
If all that the court is doing when its saying due process is prohttps://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol2/iss1/1
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tecting a traditional way of doing things, it's dysfunctional and it's
a very costly tradition to uphold. My personal view is that due
process is a much more evolved concept than that. Tomorrow's
due process may bear very little resemblance to today's processes.
That's becoming apparent in disputes like these, that may not be
susceptible to typical adversarial litigation in any court system
that we presently have. A challenge to the students who are in
this room is to look forward to the practice of law in an environmental area knowing that there are an awful lot of unanswered
questions. The question of what process is due to each and every
party in a multi-party litigation is one of the most vexing questions that we have.
To me it's inconceivable that we could convene a trial, in a
case I'm thinking of, that has five hundred parties in it now in
which each and every one of them would have had their day in
court, and an ability to point a finger at the other 499. It's tough
enough when there are three parties, but what do you do in this
other situation. There have to be alternatives. The alternatives
are going to be extracted at some expense to the individual notion of a pure day in court. One day Congress may have to invent
a completely different environmental hearing board, court,
whatever you want to call it, as a last resort for the resolution of
these sorts of disputes. There lies a terrific challenge for each of
us in the courts and for those of us who are coming along as
young lawyers.
JOHN HYSON:
I'd like to just add a kind of practical footnote. In the area of
Superfund disputes, disputes about a presently contaminated site,
it would be historically and factually correct to say that the vast
majority of people who have gotten themselves into that kind of
legal business are people who view themselves as litigators. I
spent a little time last spring back in the real world with a firm in
Philadelphia. I became acquainted with how the environmental
bar looks at itself. First, right now there's no question but that
the legal profession sees environmental law as a growth area.
There's hardly a day goes by that I don't get some kind of a formal notice from a firm about how it has established or expanded
its environmental practice. I know that most of the people who
are identifying themselves as setting up this environmental practice are people whom I know as litigators, with perhaps a litigation mindset.
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There's a question, it seems to me, within a firm as to
whether or not you ought to allow litigators to go out and do this
kind of work which ideally would have a non-litigation response.
Within the firm where I was for a period of time, the environmental department and the litigation department were separate. My
perception was that the people in the two departments had different mindsets in terms of how to deal with an environmental dispute. The litigators wanted to litigate, and the other folks
thought of more cost-efficient responses.
HENRY PERRIT:
I promised each participant some concluding remarks. They
can, of course, say whatever they like in their remarks. I would
like to give them the opportunity to speak to a question that in
many ways is implied by what Professor Hyson said and what
Judge Simandle said.
I started this symposium by talking somewhat inartfully of institutionalization, and the notion of a more formal institutional
framework.
Suppose that we were going to institutionalize the processes.
One also can come at this institutionalization question in another
way. One can talk-and I really mean it now-talk about institutionalizing people. If you're an educational institution, or if
you're a law firm as John Hyson talked about, you would ask yourself, "What is it that we should be doing to get people to function
more like the kind of decision-maker that Judge Simandle represents, as opposed to a more traditional and more rigid judicial
decision-maker?"
Not only that, because that would focus on judges, but,
"What is it that we can do to institutionalize the kind of lawyer
that John Hyson and Judge Simandle also talk about?" As you
recall, he described four different types of litigators. If, as several
people have suggested, the existing political and litigation systems are flexible enough to accommodate the kind of dispute resolution processes that everybody has been talking about this
afternoon, what is it that all of us ought to do about the people?
We certainly have the power to do something about ourselves. As
a law school we have the power to do something about law students. Others of you, Jon [Brock] and others, have the power to
do something about public administration specialists. Larry
Bacow can influence engineers and city planners, some of whom
become lawyers to do something about it. Maybe it would be fairhttps://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol2/iss1/1
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est to start by giving an opportunity to comment on this or any-

thing else that's been said to Mr. Charla.
LEONARD CHARLA:
We live in this society that has a legal system that is adversarial. That doesn't mean every dispute or every question needs
to be fought tooth and nail, until one of the parties or maybe both
of them is lying on the floor in a pool of blood.
There is a concept called "win-win." In a "win-win" the parties can explore avenues to solution or resolution of the questions. It doesn't result in death or its legal equivalent. My feeling
is that today we have talked about a new resource that is available
to us selectively. I think that's the one word, selectively, that we've
all talked about this afternoon. One needs to look selectively at
these tools to see if they can be useful.
If there's one thing I want to leave you with, it is that we've
got an onion here. The center of the onion may not look like the
surface of it. Before you go in to resolve a problem or represent a
client, whomever the client is, make sure you take a core sample
of the onion to see what all the layers are.
HENRY PERRITF:
Judge Simandle.
JUDGE SIMANDLE:
Thanks. I guess this is the time when the candidate looks
straight into the camera and gives a two minute speech that sums
up his world view, but I'm not going to do that. I'd like to make
mention of one case study you may find interesting because I
think that it ties together several of the ideas that have been expressed this afternoon.
It was a hybrid situation where in-court and out-of-court settlement processes worked hand-in-hand to achieve an overall settlement. For that reason I think it's particularly interesting.
There was a case filed regarding the landfill in New Jersey that
threatened Atlantic City's water supply. The name of the case
was United States v. Price,2 and the site was Price's Pit. After a period of time of pure litigation, the parties came forward, the government and the PRPs, and said, "We'd like to see if we could
negotiate a remedy." This came after a substantial amount of
2. 577 F. Supp. 1103 (D.N.J. 1983).
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case management. It came after a reverse trifurcation of the trial.
That is, the issue of remedy was going to be tried first; liability
was going to be tried second; costs were to be tried third. So in
the issue of remedy the parties came forward and said, "We'd like
to see if we can negotiate a remedy. If we negotiate a remedy,
then we'd like to see if we could negotiate how much it would cost
to fund that remedy. The third thing we'd like to negotiate is
what should each parties' share of that cost be, taking into account the risks and what's allegedly hazardous waste."
We spent at least six months trying to negotiate a remedy

and it couldn't be done. It was very frustrating. Parties would
walk out of negotiations. There were completely disparate views
about whether the government's remedy or the PRPs' remedy
would be the one and neither was willing to give in to the other.
Trying to negotiate about money is difficult enough, but at least
there's a common denominator.
So a decision was made to switch this from a negotiation
about processes to a negotiation which said, "We're going to talk
about money and how much. However, into the money we're going to factor a couple of things. We're going to factor the defendants' belief that they don't trust the government's remedy, but
they're nonetheless willing to fund it, albeit on somewhat of a discounted basis. We're going to factor in the degree of risk that a
party is retaining in the end." In other words those paying into
this settlement won't be able to walk away, to "pay and walk" as
they say, but rather will have to pay and then be on the tab under
certain reopeners in the event that new conditions emerge. Or, if
some party has held back material information, then it could be
reopened.
That was, believe it or not, a breakthrough in the process.
Talking about money helped considerably. The remedy was selected, it would be the government's remedy. An amount of
money had to be negotiated. It was unclear how much it would
cost. The litigation process and this court-supervised settlement
process, addressed this question of money and finally reached an
overall agreement between the government on the one hand and
the parties on the other, as to the gross amount of money. And
subject to funding, the defendants were able to come forward as a
group. There were about fifty of them. They said as a group, "If
we can agree upon a mutually agreeable allocation among us,
then we agree as a group to fund this amount of money. We've
got to know if the government will go for that." More negotiahttps://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol2/iss1/1
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tions, and eventually the government said, "Yes, subject to the
defendants' ability to allocate among themselves, we'll take
$17.25 million."
This is where the private resolution process came into the
picture. In fact, it was Mr. Charla's organization. The defendants
went out on their own and hired a private dispute resolution process. They gave all the data that they had to the private dispute
resolvers. The dispute resolvers conducted interviews, massaged
the data, did computer analysis and everything. They gave a first
array of the data and everybody could tell them why it was wrong,
why it was too much for their particular client. Then they did a
second array of the data. All that happened very quickly. Within
90 days, the allocation was completed by the private group.
It came back to me. Everybody squawked, everybody was being required to pay too much. The question arose should there
be any adjustments at all because it was like a fifty way compact.
If you took one brick out of the yard the rest of it would collapse.
We got over that hurdle somehow. We did a little bit of massaging of that data, and arrived at a final allocation that everybody
could say was mutually unfair.
But it was a process that people had confidence in. They
knew where the numbers came from, they knew that if they had
the goods on their neighbor that this was the time to come forward with it. Everybody had that much of a chance to be heard.
Eventually the process reaches completion, the case is settled, the clean-up is in process.
Now what was learned? What was learned was that some issues can be negotiated and others can't. Some can be negotiated
in court and others are better left for dispute resolution. The
court ought to know enough to take time out so that the parties
can explore private resolution. Private resolution was not an expensive proposition. Well, it was expensive but it wasn't unduly
expensive. I don't want Mr. Charla's firm to raise the rates.
LEONARD CHARLA:
We're raising our rates.
JUDGE SIMANDLE:
The proof of the process was that it led to settlement with
fifty parties who had very different views of what ought to be done
when the whole thing started. I assumed a different judicial role
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that was more like being a ringmaster. But eventually it worked.
That's what I want to leave you with because it touches on the
points of flexibility, goodness of fit, and willingness to settle.
The final point-and I don't know if anybody has made this
today-is if you have a settlement that's fitting into place and you
have a couple of recalcitrants outside of it, the process can make it
almost unbearable to the nonsettling parties to remain outside.
The risks become too great. Now you can say that that's good or
you can say that that's bad. It's good if you believe in the finality
of a settlement and the fact that if 48 of these parties settled and
two of them were outside, those two were taking an enormous
risk. The government goes after the two. Maybe the two are not
liable, but if they are liable then they're going to be on the tab
forever, they won't have the benefit of the settlement.
You could say that it's bad to put that sort of pressure on the
parties who are "in the weeds" (you've heard that expression earlier) because it's not fair to them. Economically it's unfair, it's
cheaper for them to pay the half million that you want from them,
then for them to litigate from now 'til kingdom come as the only
parties left in the case. I think one of the judge's roles is to mediate that situation and not let a tyranny of the majority grow up in
the settlement, even though it can be counter-productive to
achieving an overall settlement. Once there is a critical mass in
the settlement, it's wonderful to see this sort of momentum go
through the rest of the case. Then all the people who are saying
this can't be done, then have to reconsider.
HENRY PERRITT:
Professor Brock.
JONATHAN BROCK:
This is sort of a kitchen sink time: everything that didn't get
said before gets said now. There are some themes here that I'd
like to mention and underline, beginning with some of the things
that just proceeded me on the part of the Judge. They reminded
me of the terms we've been using. We've been talking about institutionalization. I think the issue is in some ways less the question of institutionalizing it. Clearly the court has institutionalized,
through the judge's efforts, alternative dispute resolution procedures. The real issue is that ADR procedures not be prescribed
and rigid. The real issue is to the extent that we use them and
make them a tool as an adjunct to existing procedures or in some
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol2/iss1/1
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instances perhaps as a substitute. They must remain flexible, so
that they can match the circumstances, the parties, the issues, the
politics, and so on. That's one of the central themes that I heard
in the course of the conversation. It's very much agreed upon
here, from all of our different perspectives. If you do become involved in this, recognize the importance of the flexibility.
Germane to Hank's question that he asked us to consider, we
really do need to find some other ways to institutionalize alternative dispute resolution beyond passing a law or regulation that
requires parties to use it in hazardous waste siting or certain kinds
of regulatory disputes. The kind of institutionalization that is
likely to have more value is to make alternative dispute resolution
procedures more readily available. I don't know if it's the most
value. Hopefully five years from now I'll have learned something
that suggests some better ideas. In the meantime we'll want to
find ways like the way the court is using them in Judge Simandle's
case. Very often the procedures that we have in place are not
ADR procedures, and don't even make ADR available. That's a
big mistake. Making ADR available is important, by having it
based with the university, or based with state government, or
based with federal government or based in some non-profit
group, all providing some generic alternative dispute resolution
services. There are certainly private firms that do that and that's
fine.
Secondly, in terms of institutionalizing these things, it's important to create a greater understanding among professionals
like yourselves, as lawyers or soon to be lawyers, government administrators, and private business persons. Professionals must
create a greater acceptance and understanding of what these ADR
processes are like. People perceive them very often (you've felt
that way or may have felt that way) as secret things that go on in
barrooms, in backrooms or someplace on a street corner, where
the public interest isn't represented, and parties' interests aren't
represented. Hundreds and hundreds of examples in ADR show
that no one needs to fear for their rights. We also should make it
clear and evident that those of us who use ADR understand what
the risks are and what the risks aren't.
Let's be creative as professionals in resolving conflicts, having a greater understanding and acceptance of what these procedures are. Professionals also need to develop better skills, the
capacity to negotiate, the capacity to represent multiple clients
and mediate among them so that they can settle with the other
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side. These skills are important in our training and in our experience. To try to get these in better order behooves those of us on
the professorial side, as well as in practice.
Also we should encourage the use of alternative dispute resolution procedures as management techniques among regulators
and among business persons, who can resolve problems before
someone has to get involved in litigation or some other more formal process. There are some very nice examples increasingly
emerging of senior administrators in government agencies and in
private business evoking these techniques prior to going to court.
One caution is very important. The comment about externalities is what reminded me of it. Something that's not commonly talked about by professionals who advocate ADR is the
issue of power. One of the reasons that the courts are important
to this is that parties who would not otherwise have had access to
discuss the matter with the other party who may be the actor need
a way to get on the playing field. There needs to be a way to have
relatively equivalent power among parties; otherwise you cannot
negotiate. These legal procedures are one place that a party can
get standing. That's why they argue about the environmental impact statement and all the other stuff. It doesn't really matter to
the solution, but it gets you standing.
There are other kinds of externalities that get you standing,
and I think it's important to recognize those. Lawyers are good at
settlement. Despite all the nasty things I said about lawyers or
other people may say about you, it's common in the business, I
gather, to resolve things before a judgement is rendered-to negotiate a settlement. Institutionalizing ADR practices concerns
what it is that allows you to settle. Think about what works, then
consider the different roles that a judge or an attorney can play.
See whether or not there are some dimensions, a piece of what
we've learned about dispute resolution. Consider what will allow
you to play an even more constructive role earlier in the process
that helps the solution be an even better one. There's already
quite a tradition in your profession that could be capitalized on by
what's been learned about alternative dispute resolution. That's
something to build upon and look for.
Two final things to say. I do think the possibilities for ADR
really are in situation by situation application, perhaps under the
umbrella of an institution that often has conflicts come to it. I
don't think the subject by subject hazardous waste siting, or a particular regulatory approach for application of ADR is as fruitful.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol2/iss1/1
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It attracts too many opponents and has these problems of overspecifying the mechanism so that flexibility is lost. Situation by
situation is the better way to do it.
Finally, now that we've had several hours of telling you all of
the great principles of dispute resolution, I should tell you what
the real secret is in solving problems like this. It comes from
Casey Stengle, whom some of you may remember if you've ever
been involved with the Yankees or the Mets. He had a saying
widely quoted at one time that suggests to me the way that you
should do these things-that the secret of settling problems, I
think he called them the "secrets of good management," the secret of settling problems is taking four people who hate your guts,
and keeping them away from the five who haven't yet made up
their minds.
HENRY PERRITT:
Professor Bacow.
LAWRENCE BACOW:
I've been sitting here thinking about this question of how do
you work on the people here and "What would you do differently
if you were to train people differently?" This is a law school and
we are educators, my colleagues on the panel who do other things
have, I'm sure, spent time educating in the past, either from the
bench or when you're lecturing at various places such as this. I
know part of your job also involves educating.
As I sit here thinking about it, I also recognize that probably
most of you, who are training to be lawyers, will not spend much
of your time actually in court because very few lawyers do that.
Yet we spend a disproportionately large amount of time training
our students to do that.
It's much harder to be a problem solver than it is to be an
advocate. When you're an advocate you take your clients' interest
as given and you run with it. You are tenacious and try and do as
best for your client as you possibly can. You rely upon somebody
else to be fair and to decide what represents a just outcome.
That's not your responsibility.
To be a problem solver is much tougher. It requires not only
that you see what your clients' interests are, but you see what the
other side's interests are, because only in that way can you discover an outcome that really represents a meeting of the minds.
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It's tougher because once you accept responsibility for solving the
problem or see it as part of your role, then you have to muck
around in things which aren't so easily understood, which go beyond just advocating the interest of your clients. Because there
are externalities, you do get involved in drawing in other parts of
the problem or other problems or thinking about how to package
things. By necessity you're drawn into disputes which occur in
places other than inside the courthouse or in a room where one is
taking a deposition or outside the formal bounds of discovery.
It means that you have to start understanding politics, and
how the world works. You have to understand deals which you
might craft, solutions that are actually going to be implemented.
What are people going to do tomorrow in order to make this
thing work? You're taking some responsibility for figuring out
how to make it work. That's very hard.
As I think about what one might do if you were to try and
train people differently, it would be to think hard about what a
legal education would look like if we invested more time in teaching our students how to be problem solvers. The really good lawyers are just not litigators. The lawyers who are not just
litigators, who are really respected by their peers, and are good
problem-solvers-the people who are really good at figuring out
how to crack the nut. The education might look a little bit different if we spend more time on thinking about how to train people
to do that.
Now, what would that entail? It would entail a curriculum in
which we spent more time teaching negotiation skills. Although
these are found now in just about every law school curriculum, I
think we can still do more there. It would involve a curriculum in
which we spent more time teaching about the tip of the iceberg
that tends to be represented by the cases that we read, in rooms
like this. I always like to tell my students when we read a case that
behind every case there's a story. All you're reading is the judge's
view of the story. What else was going on? It would take a lot
more work thinking about curriculum that expanded beyond our
own confines of what we traditionally view as the lawyer's role.
One of the reasons why this is an interesting profession to be
in, is while we have an exclusive franchise, practicing law, we also
have a free hunting license to invade the territory of all sorts of
other people to do other interesting things. If we are going to do
that-and that's one of the reasons that many of us have been
attracted to the law and this training-then the institutions, the
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol2/iss1/1
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trainers, at least, have some responsibility to equip us better to go
forth and do these things.
JOHN HYSON:
I had not intended to say anything in my role as officious intermeddler, but I must say I've been inspired by, truly inspired by
Larry's comments. I agree with everything he said. I just want to
kind of put a more specific spin on it, shall we say. It seems to me
that those of us who are involved in teaching law are easily attracted to courses and ways of teaching that provide clear rules.
Procedure, to those of us who teach procedure, provides a clear
framework in which disputes are resolved. Also, some of us are
attracted to the litigation model because there are clear winners
and losers. You don't want to be a clear loser, but lotteries are
attractive because we all have in our minds psychologically the
potential of being clear winners. The difficulty with ADR, what
makes it somewhat unattractive, to law teachers is that the rules
don't seem very clear. We may have a hunting license to get into
other areas that may be interesting, and I agree that's a fascination, an attraction of what we do. But when we get into other
areas, such as alternative dispute resolution, we have to understand that dealing with ADR means thinking about politics. Even
more, it requires thinking about people and what people need,
what various interest groups need.
Those kinds of inquiries do not lend themselves to clear rules
and they are unattractive, therefore, to the teacher who wants to
present the student with the idea that the teacher knows the rule,
and has mastered the rules. From the teacher's perspective, too,
when you get into ADR, you don't know exactly what you're getting yourself into. Those that are involved in the ADR process
know when you get a large number of people together in a room,
you walk in there and you don't know what's going to come out of
it. You don't have much control. And I think deep within all of
us is this need to have control. At least one person here is working against that, my colleague who is moderating this particular
program. Hank Perritt, I think, has more comfort with uncertainty than just about anyone else I know around here. Hank is
willing to go into areas where I know I fear to tread, but I'm convinced, especially by what has happened today and by Larry
Bacow's comments, that we have to persuade ourselves as teachers of the law to get into these areas of law, however uncomfortable we may find them, and to give our students confidence in
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getting into these areas so that they can be more effective lawyers
in the kind of problems that we are talking about. Thank you.
HENRY PERRITT:
I wanted to make sure that each participant got his guaranteed time to wrap up, so, what I did, was to borrow some of your
[the audience's] time for that purpose. Now I can yield back your
time. I know that some of you have additional questions or comments. I promise that we will adjourn at exactly 4:30 which is the
scheduled commencement time for the reception. Other questions or comments?
MEMBER OF AUDIENCE:
I have a problem. I like what you're saying; I like the idea.
You're saying that lawyers need to be more creative in resolving
issues. Perhaps, some of the things that I do, like fundraising, all
need to be part of the education of attorneys as well. You also
mentioned that there are some societies that resolve disputes
without courts, and I'm thinking particularly of civil law countries.
Do you see evolution more in that direction?
JONATHAN BROCK:
I'm not sure I can say that we're evolving in that direction.
Are we more or less litigious today than we were 20 years ago?
That's, I think, probably an easy one to answer, we are more. So,
the direction that we're going in is not necessarily the one that I
personally would like to see. However, I also feel compelled to
issue a disclaimer. You're talking to somebody who doesn't practice law. I revealed my preferences. I am sort of self-selected into
the kind of activity I do because of these sorts of beliefs that I
have. But there are other societies (I would advise you to take a
look at the Scandinavian countries). They deal with a whole
range of disputes, ranging from disputes in the workplace to disputes of a public nature to private disputes as well, in a way that is
very different from the way we do it here. Maybe we need only
look a little bit to the north, Canadians also do things somewhat
differently than we do. Perhaps, we need to spend more time
looking at how others do things.
HENRY PERRITT:
Part of the evolution is what's going on here. Never mind the
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lawyers, the reason clients end up in court is that they don't think
they have any other process available to them to resolve the dispute. A lot of people that have commented about the increase in
litigiousness have suggested that it has occurred because of a decline and a falling away of other kinds of mechanisms that formerly were available to us as real ways of resolving disputes.
What hopefully can happen-and is happening, at least, this afternoon-is that we're trying together to think of some new kinds of
mechanisms that will work practically as better ways of resolving
people's disputes. As we really provide those, if we succeed in
making them available and making them really useful, then litigiousness will take care of itself because people won't go to court if
they've got something else that works better. Sometimes that's
the case.
MEMBER OF AUDIENCE:
Four months ago I began with EPA as a Superfund attorney.
I bought this whole mindset. Everyday there's opportunities for
me either to practice law strong or blatantly or to give them a
chance to use some ADR techniques. As long as it's a litigation
contest, there's an incentive and maybe an obligation, to keep
putting up issues. There's one machine that cranks out the same
brief that strikes up the same affirmative defenses over and over
again, and of course, on this side I have the same briefs that are
used across the country. As long as there is litigation contests
then this waste of resources will be there.
HENRY PERRITT':
So in some sense the transaction costs are lower if you litigate, then if you problem solve, because as Professor Bacow said,
problem solving is hard and litigation can be mass produced.
LEONARD CHARLA:
There's a trend in Superfund litigation that those affirmative
defenses are falling. The Superfund PRP who litigates, litigates at
his or her peril. The chances grow dimmer, so bright PRPs
should tend to avoid mindless, knee-jerk litigation because it
doesn't solve their problem. What happens is they get to the end
of it, and the bill is much, much more expensive. The more sophisticated players don't litigate, but new folks who perceive the
statute as unfair, and I suggest to everybody that it probably is an
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unfair statute, will come in and will out of a sense of injury run to
the courthouse.
LAWRENCE BACOW:
So, in some sense, to unite their points about evolution, and
an earlier point about externalities, the way you ensure things will
all be in a desirable direction is to manipulate the external disincentives. If I understood your last point, I find that it is an ironic
externality, that may be helpful in an evolutionary sense, that the
unsatisfactory nature of Superfund makes it better for people to
work things out than litigate.
LEONARD CHARLA:
I don't know of its unsatisfactory nature, I do know that if you
take someone off the street and explain that here's a statute that is
retroactive, has joint and several liability, and you explain to them
what that means, they feel it's not fair, and that's almost universal
in business.
HENRY PERRITT:
Thank you. Yes, sir.
MEMBER OF AUDIENCE:
I wanted to pick up on both points-through my experience
as a litigator and a problem solver. Most problems don't get
solved until very close to the crisis point, even at the courthouse
steps. You've got to make a decision when you're at a point
where you're spending large sums of money on litigation. What
that leads to very often is that people defer the crisis point. They
spend a lot of money to avoid getting into a crisis sooner and
therefore delay solving the problem. That's why solving a problem can be more expensive and why people waste time with several needless defenses-they are avoiding the crisis point. Often
we do not necessarily need more enlightened attorneys, but more
enlightened clients. Clients that are not going to stand for this
waste of money, they're going to realize that you can pay me now
or pay me later. Let's pay now to avoid paying more later. Another point, in terms of whether it's easier or harder to be a problem-solver rather than an advocate, is that there is a tremendous
amount of money to be made in environmental litigation, there
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are very few environmental problem-solvers out there. We can all
ask ourselves why.
JUDGE SIMANDLE:
Speaking again of external disincentives to litigation, the
EPA attorney, touches upon an important point. That is that
even though the government can crunch down upon any number
of PRPs at a particular site, even though the government can
choose its own remedy, and do so within a pretty broad area of
statutory discretion, the government has very limited resources
for this purpose. Superfund is only funded to the tune of a small
fraction of the total clean-up costs. The incentive for EPA has to
be to encourage private party settlements. By private party settlements, I mean, one where the private parties put money up right
from the get-go rather than EPA funding the studies and doing
the clean-up and doing everything else, and then chasing after
people through section 107 litigation later on. That's one strong
incentive the government has for resolving these disputes without
litigation.
If one were to say what improvements could be made in
Superfund law that might enhance the prospects of private party
settlements, the strongest one would be to reward the party that
comes forward and actually does present an acceptable remedy.
If a party does so and then launches a contribution action against
fellow PRPs, it could be compensated with something of a multiplier similar to a private attorney general. On the one hand they
have dirty hands, quite literally, on the other hand, they're performing a function that can't be performed with only a few hundred governmental attorneys throughout the country. It has to
be performed at some level privately. I'm not suggesting that this
ultimately has to be privatized litigation-not at all. However,
I'm saying that I'm already seeing several lawsuits in which the
small group of PRPs that is actually funding a governmental approved remedy is then taking the bull by the horns, launching the
contribution action, but doing so at some risk. Risk of undercompensation and risk of transaction costs that won't be repaid.
HENRY PERRITT:
Yes, sir.
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MEMBER OF AUDIENCE:
Well, I'm one of those hated and unrepresented litigators. I
represent both sides, both for the government and for the private
bar. I think there are factors that make it difficult to settle under
Superfund, that are not just factors of traditional litigation. The
most important factor is that Superfund is really a type of public
interest law. Therefore, both sides, to some extent, can engage in
negotiations, but they cannot give up-what purely private litigants can give up-money. In other words, if it is a specific question of money, and I think it was significant in Judge Simandle's
case, which settled for money, I think that is the way most of them
are going to go. It's very difficult for the government to say that
I'm not going to do the remedy that I want to do, or I'm going to
do something somewhat different. A neutral person, a neutral
fact-finder, can say now wait a minute. You have your public position, and we understand that you can't take the position that you
aren't protecting the public. It would be a politically difficult
thing to do, but there are some realities of getting the job done
and cleaning up the sites. That is a way which starts negotiations.
Flexibility often is not present in the system because the government enters the system saying, "I will not be flexible. I have a
mandate to get to zero or whatever it may be." Then there is the
crowd of people saying, "Well, no matter how much I like cleaning up the environment, and believe it or not, all companies do, I
cannot spend an unlimited amount of money to reach zero."
When we get into negotiations before Judge Simandle at that
point there is still some secrecy. I'm not saying you should have
complete secrecy, some secrecy allows the parties, just as they
would in labor negotiations to say, "Okay, there is a reality here,
do you want to move the program ahead?" Let's not go to the
moon here, on either side. Let's start with some reasonable positions, then the litigation contest does allow the full process to go
forward, but because of the cost pressures.
It is a shame that it's happening more. The whole purpose of
Superfund is really a partnership. EPA said, "Let's see how we
can clear these sites, in a partnership." That was the word used.
Superfund is a partnership of public and private effort to clean up
the sites. It's become more of a rigid type of statute with each
one saying, "I can only do this much." However, I am hopeful
that it'll join this whole thing together as an arbitrator or mediator mediates a solution to get the sites cleaned up.
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HENRY PERRITr:
It seems to me that this is an appropriate place to end the
discussion. I would like to thank our participants for an absolutely fascinating set of presentations. I would like to thank you
for coming and for participating in this. I would like to thank Liz
Grieco for organizing it and creating the opportunity for all of us,
and thank Karen Palestini and the Board of Editors of the Villanova Environmental Law Journal.
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